Game Between the Government and Coal-fired Power Plants on Carbon Emission Reduction Policybased on multi-objective decision-making

With the excessive consumption of fossil energy, how to reduce carbon emissions is one of the urgent problems that the government needs to solve. As one of the main sources of carbon emissions, coal-fired power plants are affected by government carbon emission control. On the other hand, as a coal-fired power plant, it is inevitable to pursue profit maximization. Therefore, there is a game between carbon-fired power plants and the government on carbon emission reduction policies. This paper takes the government and coal-fired power plants as the research object, and uses the theory of evolutionary game and iteration to construct a multi-objective decision-making model. The results show that the game between China's current government and coal-fired power plants tends to be carbon trading policy and passive emission reduction, but in the end it will evolve to carbon tax policy, active emission reduction.