In the theoretical framework of equity equality, the protection of shareholder rights has long been a central concern among researchers. With the development of modern corporate structures, the prevalence of parent-subsidiary company models has increased. Under the traditional inspection rights model, shareholders of the parent company typically lack the authority to exercise inspection rights over their closely affiliated investments in subsidiary companies. However, if a legal personality confusion arises between the parent and subsidiary companies, legal barriers between them may restrict the ability of the parent company's shareholders to make decisions and supervise the affairs of the subsidiary. This situation may indirectly infringe upon the rights of the parent company's shareholders, violating the fundamental theoretical requirements of equity protection in corporate law.

Therefore, based on the core research focus of protecting the interests of minority shareholders, and addressing the contradictions and loopholes in the current legislation regarding inspection rights in China, this paper conducts a more in-depth study and discussion on the issues related to the traversal system of shareholder inspection rights. The aim is to enhance the legislation related to these theories and provide a more comprehensive framework for the protection of minority shareholder interests.