环境规制对企业ESG漂绿的影响:基于高管薪酬的调节效应

The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Corporate ESG Greenwashing: Based on the Moderating Effect of Executive Compensation

  • 摘要: 本文利用2009—2022年间我国A股上市公司数据,基于碳交易政策冲击和环境规制强度的双重方式度量环境规制,运用双重差分和面板回归模型,探讨了环境规制对企业ESG漂绿的影响。研究发现,环境规制能够显著抑制企业ESG漂绿。进一步的机制分析发现,环境规制通过推动企业提升ESG绩效,对漂绿产生抑制效应。调节效应分析表明,高管股权激励薪酬对环境规制抑制企业ESG漂绿起到正向调节作用,而高管货币性薪酬无显著的调节作用。异质性分析表明,国有企业、非四大事务所审计的企业以及低代理成本企业中,环境规制对ESG漂绿有显著的抑制效果。

     

    Abstract: This paper uses the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2022, measures environmental regulation based on the dual approaches of carbon trading policy shock and environmental regulation intensity, and employs the difference-in-differences and panel regression models to explore the impact of environmental regulation on corporate ESG greenwashing. The research finds that environmental regulation can significantly curb corporate ESG greenwashing. Further mechanism analysis reveals that environmental regulation exerts an inhibitory effect on greenwashing by promoting enterprises to enhance their ESG performance. The moderating effect analysis indicates that executive equity incentive compensation positively moderates the inhibitory effect of environmental regulation on corporate ESG greenwashing, while executive monetary compensation has no significant moderating effect. Heterogeneity analysis shows that environmental regulation has a significant inhibitory effect on ESG greenwashing in state-owned enterprises, enterprises audited by non-big-four accounting firms, and enterprises with low agency costs.

     

/

返回文章
返回