Abstract: In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", Quine positions Carnap's project in Der logische Aufbau der Welt squarely in the empiricist tradition, and seeks its philosophical point by means of Russell's external world program. Since the 1967 publication of the English translation of the Aufbau, Quine's interpretation has given rise to many problems, i.e. the puzzling construction of the experiential objects and the optional nature of the form of the epistemic system. Among these philosophers, the general trend is toward recognizing the influence of broadly Kantian views on Carnap. According to neo-Kantian reading, the Aufbau's center of gravity lies in the construction theory rather than the epistemic system, and the goal of construction theory is to account for the formal or structural characterization of all scientific concepts through a unified system of purely structural definite descriptions. Carnap uses the notions of logical form and the unity of science to solve the problem of the objectivity of scientific knowledge, in order to articulate and defend a radically conception of objectivity, and avoid the problems in Quine's reading. Taking both interpretations into account, it is more desirable that a balance be striked between the reductionism and structuralism in its articulation of Carnap's project.