Abstract: China Certified Emission Reduction (CCER) is of great significance to the realization of the "double carbon" target. In-depth analyses of the game relationship among the participants can help to reveal the complex interactions between the government's regulatory attitude and the participating enterprises and third parties in the CCER market, thus promoting the effective operation of the CCER market, the achievement of the low-carbon development goal, and the smooth implementation of the "dual-carbon" strategy. This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model between the government, participating enterprises and the third-party review body from the perspective of the main participants in the CCER market, analyses the evolutionary stability of the strategic choices of each participant, and investigates the influence of different factors on the strategic choices. Meanwhile, the stability characteristics of the equilibrium point of the tripartite game system are further studied, and the reliability of the results is verified through model simulation, which provides policy suggestions for the government to optimize the regulatory mechanism of CCER trading.